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THE EFFECT OF THE PATIENT SAFETY ACT ON
COMMON-LAW DISCOVERY RULES
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“I know no method to secure the repeal of bad or obnoxious laws so
1
effective as their stringent execution.”
***
“Hard cases, it has been frequently observed, are apt to introduce bad
2
law.”
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1999, the Institute of Medicine reported that as many as 98,000
3
deaths were attributed to medical error nationally each year. In 2000,
the health care industry in New Jersey ranked forty-eighth in patient
4
care and safety. Considering these findings, the New Jersey Legislature
enacted the Patient Safety Act (hereinafter the “Act”) in 2004 in order to
5
improve patient care. With the central objective to assure that hospitals
and health care facilities report certain serious preventable adverse
6
events to government agencies, the statute provides a mechanism for
hospitals to engage in a process of self-critical analysis through

3

COMM. ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AM., INST. OF MED., TO ERR IS HUMAN:
BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM 1 (Linda T. Kohn et al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter IOM
REPORT]. See also S. 2015, 210th Leg., at 5 (N.J. 2002) (statement to New Jersey Senate for
S. 2105 as pre-filed for introduction in the 2002 session).
4
S. 2015, 210th Leg., at 5 (N.J. 2002) (statement to New Jersey Senate for S. 2105 as
pre-filed for introduction in the 2002 session). While New Jersey ranked as the third-worst
state with respect to patient safety in 2000, the cross-state ranking continued to drop. In
2006, Health Grades ranked New Jersey last for hospital patient safety. See HEALTH
GRADES, INC. THIRD ANNUAL PATIENT SAFETY IN AMERICAN HOSPITALS STUDY 3 (2006),
available at http://www.allhealth.org/briefingmaterials/HealthGradesQualityStudy-75.pdf.
In 2011, Health Grades determined that New Jersey ranked forty-ninth in risk adjusted
bloodstream infection rates. See HEALTH GRADES, INC. EIGHTH ANNUAL PATIENT SAFETY IN
AMERICAN
HOSPITALS
STUDY
3
(2011),
available
at
https://www.cpmhealthgrades.com/CPM/assets/File/HealthGradesPatientSafetyInAmerican
HospitalsStudy2011.pdf.
5
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-12.24(c) (West 2004).
6
§ 26:2H-12.25(a)-(e).
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7

confidential, cross-disciplinary communication. The Act, which
8
attempts to create a non-punitive approach to patient safety, generally
9
protects the confidentiality of documents within its purview. Yet with
the passage of the bill and its mandatory application, the degree to
10
which the Act modifies the common-law approach is unclear.
This Note analyzes the evidentiary privilege afforded to selfcritical analysis in New Jersey. Specifically, this Note focuses on the
degree to which the Patient Safety Act replaces the New Jersey courts’
grant of discovery rights to factual portions of materials and documents
created as part of a process of self-critical analysis within the medical
11
industry. Given New Jersey’s preference for broad discovery, New
Jersey’s Patient Safety Act does not replace the common-law rule,
which allowed discovery of factual portions of documents generated
during self-critical analysis of adverse events. Part I of this Note will
demonstrate the statute’s ambiguity as to the degree of discoverability
these documents face and engage in an interpretative examination of the
Act applying those factors dictated by the New Jersey judiciary.
Part II of this Note will discuss the history of reporting adverse
events in the United States and New Jersey, as well as the status of the
self-critical analysis privilege in New Jersey prior to the Legislature’s
adoption of the Patient Safety Act in 2004. Part III will discuss the
enactment of the Patient Safety Act and its relationship to the New
Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division’s decision in Christy v.
12
Salem. Part IV will discuss how New Jersey courts have approached
discovery of factual portions of self-critical reports created by health
care professionals and institutions following the adoption of the Patient
Safety Act. Part V will apply statutory interpretation to determine
whether the Patient Safety Act bars discovery of factual portions of
documents created as part of a process of self-critical analysis.

7

§ 26:2H-12.25(f)-(k).
§ 26:2H-12.24(c).
9
See § 26:2H-12.25(f)-(k).
10
See, e.g., Applegrad v. Bentolila, No. L-0908-08, 2011 WL 13700 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. Jan. 11, 2011) [hereinafter “Applegrad I”].
11
See Christy v. Salem, 841 A.2d 937, 942 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004) (citing
Kernan v. One Washington Park Urban Renewal Assocs., 713 A.2d 411, 426 (N.J. 1998)).
12
See Christy, 841 A.2d at 937.
8

SARDINA NOTE FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE)

210

1/18/2013 1:36 PM

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

[Vol. 37:1

II. SELF-CRITICAL ANALYSIS PRIVILEGE IN NEW JERSEY:
AN OVERVIEW
A. What is Self-Critical Analysis
13

14

New Jersey courts, along with other jurisdictions, recognize a
privilege of analysis contained in evaluative reports. The self-critical
analysis privilege generally requires the following: (1) that the
information sought resulted from self-critical analysis conducted by the
party seeking to invoke the privilege; (2) that public policy encourage
preservation of an atmosphere that promotes uninhibited flow of the
information within the industry; and (3) that disclosure of such
information would be detrimental to the free exchange of such
15
information within the industry. New Jersey courts have recognized
16
the privilege within a number of industries, including employment and
17
health care.
B. The Rise of Self-Critical Analysis Procedures in New Jersey
As the health care industry flourished in the mid-twentieth century,
national medical associations sought to improve patient care through the
18
application of uniform standards of care. These industry groups formed
the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals (“Joint
Commission”) to promote hospital-based reform through an evaluative
19
process of health care institutions. In 1965, hospitals seeking
participation in the Medicare system could do so by meeting the Joint
Commission’s accreditation criteria, thus solidifying its power as the
20
leader in-patient care auditing. In 1979, the Joint Commission
implemented an auditing system among its accredited hospitals
21
requiring participants to organize systems of quality assurance. Under

13

See, e.g., Payton v. New Jersey Turnpike Auth., 691 A.2d 321, 332-33 (N.J. 1997).
See, e.g., In re Crazy Eddie Sec. Litig., 792 F. Supp. 197, 205 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
15
See, e.g., Wylie v. Mills, 478 A.2d 1273, 1277 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984).
16
See Payton, 691 A.2d at 332-33.
17
See Christy, 841 A.2d at 940-41.
18
See Carl F. Ameringer, THE HEALTH CARE REVOLUTION: FROM MEDICAL MONOPOLY
TO MARKET COMPETITION 190-95 (Berkeley, CA 2008).
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Reyes v. Meadowlands Hosp. Med. Ctr., 809 A.2d 875, 876-78 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law.
Div. 2001).
14
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its current criteria for accreditation, hospitals must perform self-critical
assessments in the wake of certain events involving potential medical
22
errors or unanticipated negative outcomes.
With the growth of the health care market and the promulgation of
peer review policies for Joint Commission accredited hospitals, the New
Jersey Legislature sought to mandate such a peer review policy for New
Jersey hospitals. In 1999, the New Jersey Legislature enacted hospital
23
licensing standards, which required, among other things, that hospitals
conduct medical “peer review programs” as a condition of their
24
licensure. In doing so, the Legislature required these programs to
perform self-critical analysis of negative outcomes by evaluating patient
25
care through ongoing monitoring.
C. Privileged: The New Jersey Courts Approach to Self-Critical
Analysis
In the wake of such accreditation requirements by the Joint
Commission and the New Jersey Legislature, litigants began seeking
materials associated with those peer review programs for use in medical
malpractice suits. In Christy v. Salem, decided three months prior to the
New Jersey Legislature’s adoption of the Patient Safety Act in April
2004, the New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division treated facts in
26
medical peer review reports separately from evaluative material.
Christy arose out of a medical negligence action brought by a
plaintiff, Gilbert Christy, who became paralyzed during his course of
treatment at the defendant-hospital. Christy was injured in a car accident
27
and taken to Capital Health System at Fuld. After performing
radiological studies on Christy, doctors prematurely removed his
28
breathing tube resulting in his paralysis. Christy filed a complaint
29
alleging malpractice. In the aftermath of his paralysis, the hospital’s
internal “peer review committee” investigated the matter and generated

22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

Id.
N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 8:43G-2.12(a) (2012).
§ 8:43G-27.1(d).
§ 8:43G-27.5.
Christy, 841 A.2d at 941-42.
Id. at 938.
Id.
Id.
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30

a written report. During discovery, depositions of treating physicians
resulted in conflicting testimony regarding the factual account of his
31
care. In light of such discrepancies, the plaintiff sought a copy of that
32
report. The hospital resisted, claiming that the report was privileged
33
from disclosure as confidential, self-critical analysis. The trial court,
after examining the report in camera, determined that it was not
34
privileged, and that the report was discoverable in its entirety.
In a unanimous decision by the Appellate Division, the three-judge
panel affirmed the trial court’s determination in part and reversed in
35
part. Rather than granting blanket permission to discover all
information contained within the report, the Appellate Division allowed
facts to be discoverable while barring discovery of evaluative and
36
opinionated portions of the report. The court further stipulated that
those facts contained in documents falling within the rubric of selfcritical analysis were not barred from discovery when they were also
37
contained in other non-privileged sources.
In his analysis, Judge Jack L. Lintner relied on precedent regarding
the discoverability of documents created as part of a process of self38
critical analysis in other non-medical related industries. He pointed to
the existence of the privilege under New Jersey common-law but noted
39
that New Jersey courts are generally guarded in granting the privilege.
In Payton v. New Jersey Turnpike, the New Jersey Supreme Court
refused to “adopt the privilege of self-critical analysis as a full
40
privilege.” Rather, the court viewed self-critical analysis as part of
general confidentiality, the discoverability of which should be
41
determined through the application of a balancing test. Thus, New

30

Id.
Id.
32
Christy, 841 A.2d at 938-39.
33
Id. at 939.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id. at 940.
37
Id. at 939-40.
38
See Christy, 841 A.2d at 939-40.
39
See id. at 939-41 (The court looked to the application of the self-critical analysis
privilege in Payton, 691 A.2d 321 and McClain v. College Hosp., 492 A.2d 991
(N.J.1985).).
40
Payton, 691 A.2d at 331.
41
Id.
31
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Jersey courts have established the privilege as a subclass of general
42
confidentiality rather than making it grounds for categorical exclusion.
This approach was consistent with the character of New Jersey
discovery rules, which prefer broad discovery to facilitate full
43
disclosure of fact in order to promote settlement.
Since New Jersey courts recognized the importance of
confidentiality with regards to self-critical analysis, the Payton court
44
considered the value of confidentiality through a balancing test. The
court found that “case-by-case” balancing of the party’s right to the
information against the public interest in confidentiality would provide
45
enough weight to self-critical analysis as to preclude disclosure.
However, the Payton court opined that most controversies should result
in disclosure, as public policy arguments of the self-critical analysis
privilege will not outweigh the benefits of discovery.
Relying on precedent set forth in Payton, the Christy court found
“competing interests” impressing upon the prospective disclosure of the
confidential peer review report:
On one hand, a patient has a legitimate interest in discovering
“information concerning his care and treatment” which potentially
could aid him “in prosecuting a personal injury malpractice suit.” On
the other hand, a hospital’s “right to maintain the confidentiality of
its peer review committee report embraces a public interest to
improve the quality of care and help to ensure that inappropriate
46
[medical] procedures, if found, are not used on future patients.”

To account for the countervailing interests, the court treated factual
portions of the committee report differently than the evaluative
47
portions. Specifically, the court held that the purely factual material
42

Id.
CPC Int’l, Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 620 A.2d 462, 468 (N.J. Super Ct.
App. Div. 1992) (citing Werkheiser v, T.E. Warren, Inc. 361 A.2d 603, 604 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1976)).
44
Payton, 691 A.2d at 331. See also McClain which applied a balancing test to
determine the applicability of the privilege rather than recognizing the privilege in full. The
court balanced the following criteria:
the extent to which the information may be available from another source;
the degree of harm that the litigant will suffer from its unavailability;
the possible prejudice to the agency investigation.
492 A.2d at 998-999.
45
Payton, 691 A.2d at 331.
46
Applegrad, 2011WL13700, at *5 (quoting Christy, 841 A.2d at 940).
47
See Christy, 841 A.2d at 941.
43
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outlined in the relevant section of the report was discoverable while
opinions, analyses, and findings of fact concerning the events that are
48
the subject of the plaintiff’s case were protected from disclosure. In
distinguishing between factual and evaluative aspects of a hospital’s
self-assessment materials, the court observed that the availability of
factual information from other sources does not necessarily preclude
49
disclosure of facts contained in the materials in question.
The court further required that the plaintiff seeking discovery of
50
such deliberative materials show a compelling need for disclosure. The
resulting decision ultimately valued a patient’s right to know to a
greater extent than the societal benefits of hospitals conducting fully
confidential self-critical evaluations.
As a result, Christy established three important holdings regarding
the discoverability of materials claimed to be protected under the selfcritical analysis theory: (1) courts are to conduct a balancing test of the
competing policy interests when determining the discovery of
51
information contained within self-evaluative reports; (2) when
balancing the countervailing implications, discovery of factual
information appears appropriate in the context of medical malpractice
52
litigations; (3) the mere result that factual information contained within
these reports is also found in other sources does not bar discovery of
53
those facts from the “privileged” materials.
III. THE PATIENT SAFETY ACT
A. Why A Bill Was Introduced: Mandatory Reporting
While New Jersey common-law separates fact from opinion, the
balancing test only applies to material that was prepared for mandatory
54
government reports or reports created as part of self-critical analysis.
The New Jersey Legislature codified this privilege for the health care

48

Id. at 941-43.
Id. at 941-42.
50
Id. at 942.
51
Id. at 940 (citing Payton, 691 A.2d at 333).
52
Id. at 942.
53
Christy, 841 A.2d at 941-42.
54
Kopacz v. Del. River and Bay Auth., 225 F.R.D. 494, 497 (D.N.J. 2004) (citing
Melhorn v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations, Inc., No. CIV.A. 98–CV–6687, 2001 WL 516108,
at *1 (E.D. Pa. May 15, 2001)).
49

SARDINA NOTE FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE)

1/18/2013 1:36 PM

2012] THE PATIENT SAFETY ACT AND DISCOVERY RULES

215

55

industry with adoption of the Patient Safety Act.
Prior to its enactment, however, the New Jersey Legislature
gradually regulated the health care industry’s approach to patient care.
In 1970, the Legislature limited the disclosure of information secured by
utilization review committees of certified hospitals except to physicians,
hospital administrators, insurance carriers, or representatives of related
56
government agencies. In another statute predating the Patient Safety
Act, the Legislature protected hospital peer-review committees
57
responsible for reviewing a physician’s credentials from civil liability.
However, the statute did not codify any privilege pertaining to
58
information created during that process.
In 1999, the New Jersey Department of Health and Human
Services (“Department”), which the Legislature vested authority to
59
license hospitals within the state,
codified its most significant
provision affecting the management of patient care by hospitals. As part
of the state’s current licensing process, the Department requires
hospitals to implement a “hospital-wide continuous quality
60
improvement program” in order to “monitor[] patient care.” These
programs command hospitals to appoint a quality improvement
committee with the purpose of reviewing and assessing “risk
61
management activities” in order to improve overall patient care. Yet
despite these inroads in patient care, New Jersey was the only state that
did not statutorily protect the discovery of materials created by peer
62
review committees by 1999.
B. The Patient Safety Act’s March through the Legislature
Since the implementation of N.J.A.C. § 8:43G-27.1, the
Legislature has sought to create mandatory reporting of adverse events
by hospitals to state agencies while limiting the discoverability of
55

See N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 26:2H-12.23 – 12.25 (West 2004).
§ 2A: 84A-22.8. For an explanation of utilization review committees see Todd v. So.
Jersey Hosp. Sys., 152 F.R.D. 676, 682 (D.N.J. 1993), which describes such committees as
hospital entities responsible for implementation of utilization review plans required for
participation under the Social Security Act.
57
§ 2A:84A-22.10.
58
See § 2A:84A-22.10.
59
See § 26:2H-1 et seq.
60
N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 8:43G-27.1(b) (20012).
61
§ 8:43G-27.1(d)-(e).
62
IOM REPORT, supra note 3, at 1999.
56

SARDINA NOTE FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE)

216

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

1/18/2013 1:36 PM

[Vol. 37:1
63

documents created in connection with hospital’s compliance. In 2002,
64
Democratic Senator John Girgenti first introduced a version of the
Patient Safety Act in order to “allow health care facilities to continue to
engage in open and frank discussion without fear of self65
incrimination.” This version sought to codify the self-critical analysis
privilege by barring discovery or admissibility of any “self-critical
66
analysis.” The bill specifically pronounced “all facts related to the
adverse event would continue to be available through the normal
67
discovery process.” The bill remained stagnant after being referred to
68
the Senate Health, Human Services and Senior Citizens Committee.
On January 13, 2004, a redrafted version of the Patient Safety Act
69
was introduced to the Senate. Comparable to the 2002 bill, the 2004
version (hereafter “S. 557”) embodied the basic principle of limiting
discovery of materials produced in connection with health care quality
control committees. However, the primary role of the bill was the
creation of a mandatory reporting requirement for hospitals that

63

See, e.g., S. 2105, 210th Leg. (N.J. 2002).
Senator Girgenti served twelve years in the New Jersey General Assembly before
entering the Senate in 1990. From 1990 until 2012, he represented the 35th Legislative
District comprising townships in southeastern Passaic County, New Jersey. See Senator
John A. Girgenti’s New Jersey Senate Democrats biography available at
http://njsendems.com/senator.asp?sid=35.
65
S. 2105, 210th Leg. (N.J. 2002). Note that an identical version of S. 2105, numbered
A. 2658, was introduced in the Assembly. See S. 2105, 210th Leg. (N.J. 2002) (Main bill
information available at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/bills/BillView.asp (follow “Bills 20022003” hyperlink; then follow “Bill Number” hyperlink; then search “Bill Number” for
“S2105”).).
66
The bill defined self-critical analysis as “confidential, critical, evaluative or
deliberative reports, opinions or materials prepared by a healthcare facility and its staff in
connection with a medical error.” Additionally, S. 2105 proposed the following materials to
be not considered privileged: “information obtained by observation, sampling, examining,
auditory or monitoring by any regulatory agency; information obtained from a source
independent of the self-critical analysis review; and information exchanged by and among
the department and other appropriate regulatory agencies pursuant to an agreement between
or among those agencies.” S. 2105, 210th Leg. (N.J. 2002).
67
S. 2105, 210th Leg. (N.J. 2002).
68
The bill was reintroduced to the Senate in January 2004 as S. 527, however the bill
again did not move beyond the committee phase. See S.2105, 210th Leg. (N.J. 2002) (Main
bill information available at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/bills/BillView.asp (follow “Bills
2002-2003” hyperlink; then follow “Bill Number” hyperlink; then search “Bill Number” for
“S2105”).) and S. 527, 211th Leg. (N.J. 2004) (Main bill information available at
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/bills/BillView.asp (follow “Bills 2004-2005” hyperlink; then
follow “Bill Number” hyperlink; then search “Bill Number” for “S527”).).
69
S. 557, 211th Leg. (N.J. 2004) (as introduced on Jan. 13, 2004).
64
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70

experienced an “adverse event.” In so doing, the bill’s sponsors
proposed the bill to “encourage disclosure of these events so that they
71
can be analyzed and used for improvement.” The bill required health
72
care facilities to report adverse events to the Department. Additionally,
the bill barred discovery of any document, material or information
73
created for the Department pursuant to reporting requirements.
Subsection (g) of the bill provided that “any documents, materials or
information developed by a health care facility [in connection with
reporting adverse events to the Department] shall not be subject to
discovery or admissible as evidence or otherwise disclosed in any civil,
74
criminal or administrative action.” Subsection (h) ensured that
information present in these documents would not bar “availability,
admissibility, or use. . . if obtained from any source or context other
75
than those specified.” Thus, the mere fact that a statement was present
in a document created pursuant to this proposed Act would not bar its
discoverability if contained in a document that was otherwise
discoverable.
S. 557 was referred to the Senate Health, Human Services and
76
Senior Citizens Committee, which approved the bill without change. In
a statement to the Senate, the Senate Committee noted that limitations
on discovery “shall not be construed to affect, in any way, the
availability, admissibility or use of any such documents, materials or
information if obtained from any source or context other than those
77
specified.” On February 23, 2004, the Senate passed the bill by

70

As introduced, the bill defined an “‘adverse event’ as an event that is a negative
consequence of care that results in unintended injury or illness, which may or may not have
been preventable.” S. 557, 211th Leg. (N.J. 2004).
71
S. 557, 211th Leg. (N.J. 2004) (as introduced on Jan. 13, 2004).
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id. Additionally, Subsection (g) disallowed the “documents, material or information”
from being used in “an adverse employment action or in evaluation of decisions made in
relation to accreditation, certification, credentialing or licensing of an individual” or
“considered a public record” under the state’s sunshine laws. Id.
75
S. 557, 211th Leg. (N.J. 2004) (as introduced on Jan. 13, 2004).
76
See S. 527, 211th Leg. (N.J. 2004) (Main bill information available at
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/bills/BillView.asp (follow “Bills 2004-2005” hyperlink; then
follow “Bill Number” hyperlink; then search “Bill Number” for “S557”).) and S. 557, 211th
Leg. (N.J. 2004) (as Senate Committee Substitute on Jan. 26, 2004).
77
S. 2015, 210th Leg. (N.J. 2002) (statement to New Jersey Senate for S. 2105 as prefiled for introduction in the 2002 session).

SARDINA NOTE FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE)

218

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

1/18/2013 1:36 PM

[Vol. 37:1
78

unanimous vote and the Assembly subsequently received the bill. In
the Assembly Health and Human Services Committee (“Assembly
Committee”), legislators attempted to address the Appellate Division’s
holding in Christy v. Salem decided on February 17, 2004. The
Assembly Committee amended the bill by including the word
79
“discoverability” to Subsection (h). Additionally, the Assembly
Committee added the following language to the bill: “Nothing in the
substitute is to be construed to increase or decrease the discoverability,
in accordance with Christy v. Salem of any documents, materials or
information if obtained from any source or context other than those
80
specified in this substitute.” The Assembly unanimously passed the
81
bill. On March 29, 2004, S. 557 passed the Senate by a unanimous vote
and was subsequently entered as public law upon approval by then82
Governor Jim McGreevey.
C. The Legislative Findings of the Patient Safety Act
As enacted, the Patient Safety Act seeks to improve patient safety
through a goal of “craft[ing] a health care delivery system that
minimizes. . . the harm to patients that result from the delivery system
83
itself.” To encourage compliance, the Legislature codified in its
findings the importance of open dialogue even at the expense of limited
liability:
[I]t is critical to create a non-punitive culture that focuses on
improving processes rather than assigning blame. Health care
facilities and professionals must be held accountable for serious
preventable adverse events; however, punitive environments are not
particularly effective in promoting accountability and increasing

78

See S. 557, 211th Leg. (N.J. 2004) (Main bill information available at
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/bills/BillView.asp (follow “Bills 2004-2005” hyperlink; then
follow “Bill Number” hyperlink; then search “Bill Number” for “S557”).).
79
ASSEMBLY HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. COMM., STATEMENT TO SENATE COMM.
SUBSTITUTE FOR S. 557, S. 557, 211th Leg. (N.J. 2004).
80
Id. Furthermore, the Statement accompanying the Assembly Committee’s amended
version of the bill merely quotes the amended language from the bill regarding Christy
without providing any additional insight into the meaning or intent of the included language.
See id.
81
See S. 557, 211th Leg. (N.J. 2004) (Main bill information available at
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/bills/BillView.asp (follow “Bills 2004-2005” hyperlink; then
follow “Bill Number” hyperlink; then search “Bill Number” for “S557”).).
82
Id.
83
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 26:2H-12.24(c) (West 2004).

SARDINA NOTE FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE)

1/18/2013 1:36 PM

2012] THE PATIENT SAFETY ACT AND DISCOVERY RULES

219

patient safety, and may be a deterrent to the exchange of information
required to reduce the opportunity for errors to occur in the complex
system of care delivery. Fear of sanctions induces health care
professionals and organizations to be silent about adverse events,
84
resulting in serious under-reporting[.]

Thus, the Legislature believed that in order to ensure compliance and
truthful reporting to the government agency, hospitals had to be
protected from such materials resulting in self-incriminating
consequences.
IV. NEW JERSEY COURTS’ CURRENT APPROACH TO SELFCRITICAL ANALYSIS PRIVILEGE
85

While the Patient Safety Act took effect on October 24, 2004,
litigants in medical malpractice suits continued to rely on the bifurcated
86
standard set forth in Christy. Despite the Patient Safety Act’s effect on
discoverability of peer review documents, New Jersey courts tended to
gloss over the issue in subsequent years.
87

A. Kowalski v. Palav

In a 2010 decision, the Appellate Division briefly addressed the
88
trial court’s management of a “Criterion Report” prepared by the
Hospital’s Quality Assurance Committee during the discovery process
89
and trial. The trial court granted the plaintiff access to the report during
discovery but ultimately disallowed its introduction as evidence during
90
trial. Regarding the trial court’s decision requiring the hospital to
84

§ 26:2H-12.24(e).
§ 26:2H-12.23 (West 2004). See also Patient Safety Act, ch. 9, 2004 N.J. Laws
(approved April 27, 2004).
86
See, e.g., Brief for Defendants, Manalio v. Summit Hosp., No. UNN-L-3300-04,
2005 WL 5921141 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Dec. 14, 2005).
87
Kowalski v. Palav, No. L-4433-99, 2010 WL 4107751 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
Aug. 25, 2010).
88
According to the court, the report was a one-paragraph document that briefly stated
the events surrounding the distressed birth of the plaintiff. Id. at *16.
89
Id. at *15-20.
90
Id. at *15-17. During interrogatories, defendant physician was asked whether the
hospital or any staff prepared any notes concerning the adverse event. The defendant
responded “No.” During trial Plaintiff’s counsel served a notice to produce any such
documents. The defendant hospital produced the report in question. Subsequently, the trial
court allowed plaintiffs to use the document to challenge defendant physician’s credibility.
However, the judge denied defendant’s request to “read the content of the report for the
85
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produce the report, the appellate court upheld the ruling:
Unlike the internal investigative report we considered in Christy. . .
the Criterion Report does not contain the results of any deliberative
process undertaken by the quality assurance committee. Rather, it
briefly states the facts of the case and then notes that the attending
physician recommended it for discussion from an educational
perspective. This report is not the type warranting privilege under
91
N.J.S.A. 26:2H-12.25(k).

The court’s decision regarding the discoverability of the Criterion
Report in Kowalski appears to contradict the statutory language and the
Legislature’s codified intent for enacting the statute. As previously
noted, subsection (3)(k) of the Patient Safety Act arguably intends for
the statute not to disturb the Christy court’s holding regarding the
discoverability of parallel information if it is contained in both the
documents created in connection with the mandatory reporting system
92
as well as other sources not listed in the statute. Furthermore, the
statute was specifically enacted to shift the punitive approach to
93
improving patient care to a non-punitive focus.
94

B. Applegrad v. Bentolila I: The Dilemma
The extent to which the Act affected the Christy holding did not
95
appear before the Appellate Division until Applegrad v. Bentolila I. In
this medical malpractice action arising out of injuries sustained during
96
the minor plaintiff’s birth, the plaintiffs challenged the trial court’s
interlocutory rulings sustaining the assertion of privilege as to thirteen
pages of internal hospital records that were withheld during discovery.
The records were withheld on the basis that they were fully protected
from disclosure under the Patient Safety Act as well as under other
97
statutes, regulations, and case law. During discovery, plaintiffs sought
defendant hospital’s production of documents surrounding the adverse

record. . . [because] ‘the results of these meetings are not admissible under the law.’” Id. at
*15-16.
91
Id. at *20.
92
See Applegrad I, 2011 WL 13700, at *8.
93
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-12.24(a)-(e) (West 2004).
94
See Applegrad I, 2011 WL 13700.
95
Id. at *1.
96
Id.
97
Id. at *1-2.
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98

event in question. The hospital withheld certain quality assurance
reports, claiming its discovery was barred under the self-critical analysis
99
theory.
The panel remanded the matter to the trial court, finding the record
100
to be inadequate concerning the specific genesis of each document.
After the plaintiffs moved to compel the production of the documents,
101
the motion judge performed an in camera review of the reports. As
part of its review, the trial court applied the Christy standard and
102
subsequently redacted certain opinionated portions. However, prior to
releasing the documents to the plaintiff, the defendant’s counsel
submitted an ex parte brief claiming, for the first time, that the Patient
103
Safety Act protected the reports in total. Subsequent to this ex parte
104
communication, the motion judge denied the plaintiffs’ motion. In so
doing, the judge relied on the following reasoning:
(1) the legislative policies underlying the [Patient Safety Act]
encourage hospitals to perform confidential internal self-critical
analyses after adverse events occur; (2) the one document that [the
judge] otherwise would have released in redacted form to plaintiff’s
counsel under Christy. . . constituted ‘a quality assurance report’
fully protected from disclosure by the [Patient Safety Act]; (3)
plaintiffs had not sufficiently proven a need for disclosure, as
reflected by their ability to settle with [one defendant] without seeing
the documents at issue; and (4) the judge’s perception that the factual
information on the quality assurance report otherwise could have
105
been obtained by plaintiffs through discovery.

The Appellate Division ultimately left the issue of discoverability
undecided, instead holding that when a trial court reviews documents in
camera it must “make specific determinations regarding [the] plaintiff’s
106
access to them.” Furthermore, the court, in remanding the action,
required the trial judge to examine each document and iterate, as to each
98

Id. at *2.
Id.
100
Applegrad I, 2011 WL 13700, at *1. Plaintiffs allege that the employees of
defendant hospital failed to sufficiently monitor the labor and delivery process resulting in
their daughter experiencing oxygen deprivation culminating in brain damage.
101
Id. at *2.
102
Id. at *2-3.
103
Id. at *3.
104
Id.
105
Id. (footnote omitted)
106
Applegrad I, 2011 WL 13700, at *10.
99
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document, whether the privilege was applicable and explain its rationale
107
for ruling so.
Despite the court’s holding, it chose to “present an overview” of
the divergent views of interpreting the meaning of the Patient Safety
108
Act in light of its legal significance. Following a comprehensive
dissertation of the Christy decision and the applicable contents of the
Patient Safety Act, the court detailed two interpretations of the Patient
109
Safety Act particularly in light of the inclusion of subsection (3)(k).
The first, as advocated by the hospital defendant, advocates a narrow
construction of subsection (k), “arguing that the factual/evaluative
distinction adopted in Christy is not applicable to documents that are not
110
generated within a hospital pursuant to the [Patient Safety Act].” The
opposing viewpoint promotes an interpretation as to the statute’s
reference to Christy, preserving its applicability and other legal
authority “predating the [Patient Safety Act] to the extent they permitted
111
full or partial disclosure of certain internal hospital self-assessments.”
Such a reading contends that the “factual/evaluative distinction still
applies to documents generated under the [Patient Safety Act] if the
information is also contained in other discoverable sources that
112
preexisted the PSA.” While the court chose not to resolve the
interpretive issues, its holding imposed a procedural hurdle upon
113
providers seeking a privilege under the Patient Safety Act. By
requiring providers to certify as to the origins of documents and their
relation to the Patient Safety Act, hospitals must explain why materials
114
are privileged; this forces trial judges to dictate detailed findings.

107

To expedite the remand process, the court directed the hospital to furnish the trial
court within thirty days with detailed certification, to address each document’s origin,
purpose, generation process, and relation to patient care. Id.at *11.
108
Id. at *4.
109
Id. at *8.
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Abbot S. Brown, Hospital Malpractice: Finding the Needle in the Haystack, 204
N.J.Law Journal 545 (May 30, 2011).
114
Id.
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115

While the judiciary refused to resolve the issue in Applegrad I, the
Appellate Division continued its trend to shorten the Patient Safety
Act’s limitations on discovery. In Muenken v. Toner, the court
concluded that factual portions of a peer review committee’s report
116
were discoverable. In doing so, the court applied the balancing test
117
dictated in Christy, reaffirming the underlying rationale for treating
factual portions differently than evaluative portions with respect to the
self-critical analysis privilege:
The privilege is not all-encompassing. It applies to limited portions
of self-critical evaluations and reports, specifically those evaluative,
deliberative non-factual portions that would have a chilling effect on
doctors taking steps to improve their procedures. Furthermore, as in
Christy [], the balancing approach has not resulted in a systematic
barring of deliberative and evaluative material that unfairly prevents
118
parties from obtaining truthful information.

While a trial court is obligated to follow the precedent dictated in Toner
and consequently apply the Christy balancing test, the underlying issue
remains unresolved. In its per curiam opinion, the Toner court did not
119
refer to the Patient Safety Act. By failing to address the statute, the
decision fails to definitively resolve the issue addressed by the
Applegrad I court.
120

D. Applegrad v. Bentolila (II): A New Standard
Although New Jersey courts continued to recognize the Christy
standard, no court had engaged in any statutory analysis to resolve the
question until the issue in the Applegrad I matter reemerged ripe for
121
review. The court examined the interplay between the qualified
privilege enumerated in Christy and the dimensions of confidentiality
proscribed by the Patient Safety Act through the lens of statutory

115

Muenken v. Toner, No. L-591-06, 2011 WL 2694431 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July
13, 2011).
116
Id. at *9.
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
See id. at *1-9.
120
Applegrad v. Bentolila, 51 A.3d 119 (N.J. Sup. Ct., App. Div., 2012) [hereinafter
“Applegrad II”].
121
Id. at 123.
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122

interpretation. The court held “that post-event investigatory and
analytic documents exclusively created in compliance with the [Patient
Safety Act] and its associated regulations, and not created for some
statutory or licensure purpose, are absolutely privileged from disclosure
123
under the [Patient Safety Act].” In so doing, the court iterated a new
standard that grants an absolute privilege to documents falling within
the purview of the Patient Safety Act unless the procedural
requirements of the Act were not observed or if the documents were
generated for non-Act purposes. In such instances, the common-law
124
standards – such as those developed in Christy – govern.
The court reasoned that the Act’s purpose – “to create a nonpunitive culture that focuses on improving processes rather than
assigning blame” – could not be furthered if the Legislature intended
plaintiffs to access factual portions of documents created for the sole
125
purpose of the new reporting requirement. Furthermore, the court
deferred to the Department’s position that the Act protected information
126
exclusively developed during the process of self-critical analysis.
Despite its ultimate holding, the court branded the statute’s
reference to Christy as “an eleventh-hour attempt by legislators to deal
127
with brand-new case law.” Furthermore, the court forewarned healthlaw professionals:
Another important caveat to bear in mind is that our construction of
the PSA is not an invitation to health care providers to shield
information that was previously accessible under Christy or under
other law by indiscriminately labeling such formerly accessible items
as “PSA material.” Nor does the law allow a health care facility to
evade the limitations of N.J.S.A. 26:2H–12.25(h) and (k) by giving
job titles to hospital personnel such as “PSA officers” when, in fact,
they are performing functions that are not truly covered by the
128
PSA.

Through this caveat, the court cautions health care facilities against
pretextual posturing.
While the Applegrad II court appears to resolve the ambiguity of
122
123
124
125
126
127
128

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at124 (quoting § 26:2H-12.25(g)).
Applegrad II, 51 A.3d at 139-40.
Id. at 138.
Id. at 140-41.
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the Patient Safety Act, the court notes that the issue is still unresolved
129
despite its holding. On remand from Applegrad I, proponents for a
continuance of the Christy standard contended that the provision at
130
issue was unconstitutional under the laws of New Jersey. The New
Jersey Constitution affords the New Jersey Supreme Court absolute
dominion over the judiciary’s procedural rules, while evidentiary rules
are adopted only through the participation of all three branches of
131
government. The court in Applegrad II left the constitutional issue
unresolved:
Given this backdrop of constitutional and legal history, we decline to
pronounce the confidentiality provisions in the PSA an invalid
exercise of legislative power. Moreover, we agree with the trial
judge that the ultimate assessment of this constitutional question is
best reserved to the Supreme Court, as the final arbiter of the
132
boundaries among our three branches of State government.

V. APPLICATION OF NEW JERSEY COMMON-LAW ANALYSIS
Understandably, the reference to Christy in subsection (3)(k) has
caused considerable consternation for courts, as evinced by the
133
divergent holdings in Muenken and Applegrad II. Discovery of factual
information contained within reports created for the Department or
documents generated to fashion such reports has considerable policy
implications. Currently, the Appellate Division’s application of the
Patient Safety Act in light of the first two parts of Christy remains
134
discordant. While some appellate courts recognize the Christy
standard in full, the court in Applegrad II resolved the question in favor
of granting a broader privilege, with limited exceptions, rather than
continued application of the Christy standard.

129
130
131
132
133
134

Salem.

See id. at 145-46.
Id. at 129.
Id. at 145.
Applegrad II, 51 A.3d at 146 (internal citation omitted).
See, e.g., Applegrad I, 2011 WL 13700.
See supra Part II.C. for a discussion of the three holdings dictated in Christy v.
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A. Process of Statutory Interpretation as Dictated by the New
Jersey Supreme Court
New Jersey’s general rules of statutory construction require “words
and phrases [to] be read and construed with their context, and [requires
that they] shall, unless inconsistent with the manifest intent of the
legislature or unless another or different meaning is expressly indicated,
be given their generally accepted meaning, according to the approved
135
usage of the language.” The New Jersey Supreme Court recently
dictated the appropriate method for engaging in textual interpretation of
136
a statute. The primary duty of the interpreting court is to “construe and
apply the statute as enacted,” and in doing so recognize that “[t]he
137
Legislature’s intent is the paramount goal.” First, it is necessary to
determine whether the statute is “‘clear and unambiguous, and
susceptible to only one interpretation’. . . [or] if there is ambiguity that
138
leads to more than one plausible interpretation.” It is clear, given
judicial recognition in Applegrad I, that competing readings of the
139
Patient Safety Act’s reference to Christy are at least plausible.
Second, any reading of the statute should presume words bear their
140
ordinary meaning and have the same meaning throughout a document.
Any ambiguous statutory language requires an examination of the
“extrinsic evidence, ‘including legislative history, committee reports,
141
and contemporaneous construction.’”
B. Does the Act Codify an Absolute Bar on Discovery of
Materials Created under the Statute?
As recognized in Applegrad I, one reading of the Patient Safety
Act bars the factual/evaluative distinction adopted by Christy as to
142
documents generated by a hospital pursuant to the statute. Any

135

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 1:1-1. (West 2004).
See DiProspero v. Penn, 874 A.2d 1039, 1048-57 (N.J. 2005).
137
Id. at 1048. (citing In re Closing of Jamesburg High Sch., 416 A.2d 896, 900 (N.J.
1980) and Frugis v. Bracigliano, 827 A.2d 1040, 1057-58 (N.J. 2003)).
138
Id. (quoting Lazano v. Frank DeLuca Const., 842 A.2d 156, 161 (N.J. 2004)).
139
See Applegrad I, 2011 WL 13700, at *8.
140
DiProspero, 874 A.2d at 1048 (citing Lane v. Holderman, 129 A.2d 8, 13 (N.J.
1954)).
141
Id. at 1048-49 (quoting Cherry Hill Manor Assocs. v. Faugno, 861 A.2d 123, 129
(N.J. 2004)).
142
See Applegrad I, 2011 WL 13700, at *8.
136
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argument that the Patient Safety Act codifies a complete bar of
discoverability of documents created within the purview of the statute
would rely heavily on the language of the statute. The Act dictates that
“documents, materials or information” received by the Department
143
required by a process of reporting, or otherwise developed as part of a
process of self-critical analysis, “shall not be subject to discovery
admissible as evidence or otherwise disclosed in any civil, criminal or
144
administrative proceeding.” Subsection (h) places an exception to the
general rule: “the provisions of this [A]ct shall not be construed to
increase or decrease, in any way, the availability, discoverability,
admissibility or use of any such documents, materials or information if
obtained from any source or context other than those specified in the
145
[A]ct.”
An analysis of the language in the statute could support the
contention that the statute places an absolute bar on discovery of
documents and other materials within its scope. The statute as written
appears to begin with the premise that the self-critical analysis reports
are fully protected from discovery and that the statute itself merely adds
146
two important caveats. The first, as stated in subsection (h), seeks to
limit the statute from affecting sources independent from those
147
specifically enumerated in the Act. The second, as stated in subsection
(k), provides that nothing in the Act shall be construed to affect the
discoverability of such sources “in accordance with Christy[,] if
148
obtained from any source or context other than those specified.” The
canon of statutory construction, “expressio unius est exclusio alterius –

143

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-12.25(f) (West 2004).
§ 26:2H-12.25(g). Note that the enumerated materials of this subsection and
subsection (f) are barred from use in adverse employment actions or “evaluation of
decisions made in relation to accreditation, certification, credentialing or licensing of an
individual, which is based on the individual’s participation in the development, collection,
reporting or storage of information in accordance with this section.”§ 26:2H-12.25(f)(2),
(g)(2).
145
§ 26:2H-12.25(h).
146
See §§ 26:2H-12.24(e), 12.25(f)-(k).
147
§ 26:2H-12.25(h). For any party seeking production of facts contained within
evaluative reports, an important argument would be that the documents are not those
specifically listed. Thus, not only is the information outside the scope of the Act, but also
subsection (h) ensures that the Act in no way affects their discoverability. For example, if
the document was not developed by a healthcare facility as part of a process of self-critical
analysis or for a patient or patient’s family, then the Act would not affect its discoverability.
148
§ 26:2H-12.25(k).
144
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expression of one thing suggests the exclusion of another left
149
unmentioned – sheds some light on the interpretative analysis.” Such
an interpretation would dictate that the Legislature’s specific inclusion
of the third part of the Christy holding, without mention of the other
parts, implies that the factual/evaluative standard is excluded.
Not only does a reading of the statute support such an
interpretation, but an examination of the pertinent legislative history
also promotes a narrow reading of the statute. In 2002, S. 2015 sought
to codify the self-critical analysis privilege with respect to the health
care industry, but in so doing clearly allowed “all facts related to the
adverse event. . . to be available through the normal discovery
150
process.” Arguably, by not including this language in the 2004 version
of the bill, the Legislature intentionally sought to remove such a caveat
to the privilege. In fact, the Legislature made no mention of the
factual/evaluative distinction in any draft after 2002 or in any statement
151
accompanying such drafts. Furthermore, S. 2105 was reintroduced to
the Senate Committee, as S. 527, on the same day that S. 557 was
introduced to the same committee. While “an affirmative expression
152
ordinarily implies a negation of any other,” there was no implied
exclusion, but rather an explicit acceptance of S. 557 at the expense of
153
S. 527, which had codified the factual/evaluative distinction. Such a
reading would ensure that the Christy caveat would not act as a long
arm able to reach into these specific documents and reports simply
because the information may be found elsewhere.

149
Brodsky v. Grinnell Haulers, Inc., 853 A.2d 940, 946 (N.J. 2004) (citing Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabel, 536 U.S. 73, 80 (2002) and Allstate Ins. Co. v. Malec, 514 A.2d
832, 835 (N.J. 1986). See also, In re Vince, 67 A.2d 141, 147 (N.J. 1949) (“Where the
policy and purpose of the statute indicate that the common-law was intended to be
superseded, and the working of the statute is so complete that it reasonably appears to be
exclusive, the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius may be said to be applicable.”).
Alternatively, the canon is referred to as inclusio unius est exclusion alterius.
150
S. 2015, 210th Leg., at 6 (N.J. 2002) (statement to New Jersey Senate for S. 2105 as
pre-filed for introduction in the 2002 session).
151
See S. 527,211th Leg. (N.J. 2004) (Main bill information available at
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/bills/BillView.asp (follow “Bills 2004-2005” hyperlink; then
follow “Bill Number” hyperlink; then search “Bill Number” for “S557”).) and S.527, 211th
Leg.
(N.J.
2004
(Main
bill
information
available
at
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/bills/BillView.asp (follow “Bills 2004-2005” hyperlink; then
follow “Bill Number” hyperlink; then search “Bill Number” for “S527”).).
152
Moses v. Moses, 53 A.2d 805, 810 (N.J. 1947).
153
See sources cited supra note 76.
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In support of this reading, it should be noted that a shift has
occurred since New Jersey courts first examined the self-critical
analysis privilege. In refusing to support an absolute privilege, the
Payton court dictated that recognized privileges “are rooted in our
jurisprudential traditions and reflect a firm societal commitment to
154
preserving particular confidences even at the expense of truth.”
However, the Payton court further iterated the importance of the selfcritical analysis privilege in theory:
Valuable criticism can neither be sought nor obtained nor generated
in the shadow of potential or even possible public disclosure. It is not
realistic to expect candid expressions of opinion or suggestions as to
future policy or procedures in an air of apprehension that such
statements may well be used against one’s colleague or employer in
a subsequent litigated matter. The purpose of an investigation
intended to seek criticism. . .of then existing policy or procedure is
self-improvement. The value of the investigation is questionable if
the input is not reliable. It is clear that the reliability of the input in
this situation varies inversely with the risk of disclosure of the input
155
or resulting criticisms.

Such language mirrors the Legislature’s concerns codified in the Patient
156
Safety Act.
Additionally, the court performed its analysis of the privilege
157
within the context of a wrongful termination lawsuit. As the
Legislature noted in its findings, the implication of recognizing the
privilege is to create an open forum for the health care industry to
improve patient care by reducing “the harm to patients that results from
158
the delivery” of care.
C. Reasons Why the Patient Safety Act Should be Read to Uphold
Christy v. Salem
The implication of an absolute bar of factual information contained
within those sources specifically referenced by the Patient Safety Act
would be drastic, and as such, New Jersey courts should continue to

154

Payton, 691 A.2d at 331.
Id. (quoting Wylie, 478 A.2d at 1277).
156
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-12.24(e) (West 2004).
157
See Payton, 691 A.2d at 324.
158
ASSEMBLY HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. COMM., STATEMENT
SUBSTITUTE FOR S. 557, S. 557, 211th Leg. (N.J. 2004).
155

TO

SENATE COMM.
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follow Christy in light of significant public policy considerations.
Although courts are barred from “writ[ing] an additional
qualification which the Legislature pointedly omitted in drafting its own
159
enactment,” lower courts have continued to apply the holding in
160
Christy notwithstanding the statutory language with some success.
While such a construction may appear at odds with the legislative
intent, a more critical examination of the statute supports these courts’
application of Christy.
New Jersey courts recognize that “the Legislature is presumed to
161
be aware of judicial construction of its enactments,” and that “a
change of language in a statute ordinarily implies a purposeful alteration
162
in [the] substance of the law.” By those canons of statutory
construction, courts will presume that the Legislature was aware of the
Christy decision and that the Legislature consciously included
subsection (k) in addition to subsection (h) as another condition to the
limitation on discoverability of self-critical analysis. As the New Jersey
Supreme Court bluntly stated, “we hardly need state that the Legislature
knows how to incorporate into a new statute a standard articulated in a
163
prior opinion of this Court.” Consequently, “statutory language ‘must
not, if reasonably avoidable, be found to be inoperative, superfluous or
164
meaningless.’”

159
160

Craster v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Newark, 87 A.2d 721, 723 (N.J. 1952).
See Kowalski, 2010 WL 4107751, at *19 and Muenken, 2011 WL 2694431, at *5,

*9.
161

N.J. Democratic Party, Inc. v. Samson, 814 A.2d 1028, 1039 n. 6 (N.J. 2002) (citing
Brewer v. Porch, 249 A.2d 388, 391 (N.J. 1969)).
162
Nagy v. Ford Motor Co., 78 A.2d 709, 712 (N.J. 1951) (internal quotations omitted).
163
DiProspero, 874 A.2d at 1050.
164
V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 548 (N.J. 2000) (quoting In re Sussex Mun. Utl.
Auth., 486 A.2d 932, 934 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 926. See
also Houman v. Mayor & Council of Borough of Pompton Lakes, 382 A.2d 413, 434 (N.J.
Super. Ch. Div. 1977) (“Courts must adopt that construction of a statute which reconciles
and gives reasonable meaning to all its provisions. Statutes must, if reasonably possible, be
accorded a construction which is sensible and consonant with reason and good discretion,
rather than one which, though liberal, leads to absurd consequences.”) (internal citations
omitted); White v. Hunt, 6 N.J.L. 415, 419 (1798) (adopting a contraction “not because it is
clear of difficulties, but because it seems to be the freest of embarrassment”) (Kirkpatrick,
J.); Wallace v. Wallace, 3 N.J. Eq. 616, 621 (Prerog. Ct. 1832) (“Where the construction of
a statute is doubtful, it is proper in expounding it to take into consideration the consequences
that may result from it; for it will never be presumed that the legislature intended to pass an
act that would lead to mischievous results, or unsettle the general principles of the law.”).
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This principle of statutory interpretation requires two separate
provisions, which serve as caveats to the general limitation of
discoverability, be included and given unique applications. Under such
a standard, the Legislature’s specific reference to Christy in subsection
(k) could therefore not merely be a reaffirmation of subsection (h). The
alternative reading would render subsection (k) a redundant addition
that serves as nothing but a superfluous footnote. As such, subsection
(k) must preserve the applicability of Christy to the extent that courts
permit the application of the factual/evaluative distinction to documents
generated under the Patient Safety Act if the information is also
165
contained in other discoverable sources.
Beyond the redundancy that would result in reading subsection (k)
merely to reaffirm subsection (h), such a result would have
contemporaneous adverse consequences. This interpretation would limit
litigants in medical malpractice suits from confirming factual
166
information purported by opposing parties.
Ultimately, “the search for truth is paramount in the litigation
167
process.” The importance of full disclosure of all relevant facts is
“designed to insure that the outcome of litigation in [New Jersey] shall
depend on its merits in light of all of the available facts, rather than on
168
the craftiness of the parties or the guile of their counsel.” Furthermore,
the court in Christy recognized the essential role that granting litigants
access to these reports would play with respect to the search for truth:
Oftentimes the comparison of different sources reveals
inconsistencies that aid in the search for truth. This is especially true
here, where plaintiff asserts discrepancies in the factual deposition
testimony of various doctors. It is not unusual to find subtle

165
See Applegrad I, 2011 WL 13700, at *8. If such interpretation were applied, litigants
seeking production of documents falling within the purview of subsection (f) or (g) would
merely have to show that the purely factual information is contained in other sources but
need not have those sources to demonstrate such a connection. For example, if a litigant
sought specific factual information pertaining to the position of a fetus prior to the
performance of a caesarean section, the litigant could simply ask the performing physician
in an interrogatory and/or subsequently request the production of factual portions of the
physician’s letter to the quality assurance board.
166
See Christy, 841 A.2d at 941-42.
167
Id. at 942 (citing Kernan, 713 A.2d at 426). See also Hipp v. Prudential Cas. & Sur.
Co. of St. Louis, 244 N.W. 346, 348 (S.D. 1932) (citing Curtis v. Michaelson 219 N.W. 49,
52 (Iowa 1928) (“A statute intended for public benefit is to be taken most strongly against
those who claim rights or powers under it and most favorably to the public.”).
168
Lang v. Morgan’s Home Equip. Corp., 78 A.2d 705, 707 (N.J. 1951).
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differences in both testimony and documented facts, which support
169
an argument bearing on credibility.

A narrow reading of the Patient Safety Act would constructively bar
significant procedural opportunities typically afforded to litigants. By
barring discovery of factual portions of these documents, litigants
would be forced to rely on hospitals’ strict record keeping and the
testimony of physicians, who typically serve as defendants in the
context of medical malpractice suits. Typically, statutes with procedural
implications are “given a construction, if possible, which will preserve
the essentials of harmony in the judicial system, and the established
practice should not be changed except by the clearly expressed will of
170
the lawmakers.” Undoubtedly, absent such a protection, a significant
possibility arises: defendant physicians could perjure themselves with
full knowledge that the only record of their indiscretion is contained
within their privileged reports.
Furthermore, the Christy court previously addressed any argument
that such a decision would not undercut compliance with reporting:
We are not convinced that hospital peer review committees will
intentionally leave out purely factual information, which otherwise
would provide the basis for their deliberative findings and opinions,
simply because it is discoverable. The purely factual material
171
outlined in the first paragraph of Fuld’s report is discoverable.

Additionally, it is likely that committees will continue to engage in a
process of self-critical analysis of adverse events since other statutes
172
already limit liability against such actors. Furthermore, while failure to
report does not impose specific sanctions under the statute, failure to do
173
so could result in some form of administrative sanction. Thus, not only
does statutory construction support continued application of the Christy
holding, but public policy considerations strongly encourage disclosure
of factual information in malpractice litigations irrespective of the
sources in which the fact is contained.

169

Christy, 841 A.2d. at 941-42.
In re Kuser’s Estate, 26 A.2d 688, 698 (N.J. Prerog. Ct. 1942) (internal citation and
quotation marks omitted).
171
Christy, 841 A.2d at 942.
172
See N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 8:43G-27.1 – 27.6 (2012). See also Payton, 691 A.2d at
332.
173
James G. Sheehan and Michael A, Morse, 2007 Health L. Handbook § 6:31.
170
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VI. CONCLUSION
With the enactment of the Patient Safety Act in 2004, the effect
upon the discovery of facts contained within self-evaluative reports
created by health care institutions in connection with a medical error
remains in flux. While proponents of continued disclosure argue that the
Act merely codified such a right to litigants as dictated by the judicial
system in Christy v. Salem, opponents of such a construction contend
that the Act bars discovery of any information contained within selfcritical reports created as an effort to comply with reporting
requirements. A narrow interpretation of the statute supports such a
contention in light of the Legislature’s purposes for enacting the statute.
However, given the ambiguous actions of the Legislature, as well as
countervailing public policy considerations, New Jersey Courts should
continue to grant access to purely factual information contained within
these reports. Alternatively, the New Jersey Legislature should amend
the statute (following the proper procedural requirements for imposing
new evidentiary rules) to articulate its intended effect.

